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ARGUMENT
I.

Driver's Argument on Appeal is Not About Substantial Evidence
The Respondent, Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF),

misses the point of Driver's argument on appeal.

DHCF begins its

response by asserting that Driver claims the denial of coverage
"was not supported by substantial evidence."

Brief of the

Appellee, at 11. Nowhere in her brief does Driver argue for
reversal on the basis of insubstantial evidence.

Later, DHCF

asserts that Driver failed to marshall the evidence to show that
coverage should have been allowed.

Brief of the Appellee, at 12.

Driver is not challenging a finding of fact, so there was no need
to marshall evidence.
The facts in this appeal are not in dispute.

1

The facts are

quite simple: Driver was taken by ambulance to the McKay Dee
Emergency Room where emergency medical services were provided to
save her life following an attempted suicide.

She was later

admitted to the hospital and, prior to discharge, was given the
diagnosis of bipolar disorder.
were established.

Both parties agree these facts

They differ as to the application of the facts

to the established law.
DHCF does not deny that the services provided Driver were to
save her life, not to treat her underlying mental impairment.
That being so, DHCF should have addressed why Rule R420-l-2(10)
was not followed.

As Driver pointed out in her opening brief,

the Rule says that the "Principal diagnosis at discharge" is the
main medical problem, "based on the best information available."
DHCF fails to address the fact that Driver was treated with lifesaving measures, not psychotherapy or psychotropic medications,
which would normally be provided to treat a mental impairment.
That being so, the best information available establishes that
the relevant diagnosis for UMAP coverage was "attempted suicide,"
not "bipolar disorder."
DHCF defends its actions by saying that UMAP representatives
could not be expected to "independently go in search of and
obtain information on a particular patient's condition and
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treatment."

Brief of Appellee, at 16.

DHCF did not have to go

far to determine the true cause of Driver's admission.
information was readily available to UMAP officials.

That
It is

specious to suggest, as DHCF does, that Driver should have
introduced additional evidence to support her eligibility.
DHCF further clouds the issue by suggesting that Driver's
condition at admission was the same as it was when discharged.
Brief of the Appellee, at 17.

It notes that at the time of

admission Driver exhibited "marked behaviors of mental distress,"
symptoms it argues were consistent with her discharge diagnosis.
What DHCF fails to grasp is that the admission symptoms were
recorded in the context of a life-threatening suicide attempt,
while those on discharge were recorded after the patient's life
had been saved.
In sum, Driver's appeal is not about substantial evidence
but about how a reasonable person should view the evidence.
faults Driver for not submitting more evidence.
evidence was needed?

DHCF

What further

The emergency room medical personnel knew

that Driver's life was in danger from a drug overdose.
evidence was not needed to establish that fact.

Further

The threat to

Driver's life was real and not questioned by UMAP officials.
amount of obfuscation can obscure that fact.
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DHCF has not shown how excluding self-

inflicted injuries is consistent with its expressed intent to
implement the UMAP statute by covering acute and life-threatening
conditions.
DHCF's argument by analogy at pages 21 to 2 3 that the
exclusion of coverage for self-inflicted injuries is like the
exclusion of coverage for pre-existing conditions in insurance
contracts misses the mark.

A state-mandated medical program for

the indigent is not like a contract negotiated between an
insurance company and its insured.

Driver and similarly situated

UMAP clients have no bargaining power to negotiate a contract.
In its desire to justify its position in this case, DHCF has lost
sight of its own purpose which is to provide medical care to the
poorest of the poor, not to act like a tight-fisted insurance
company intent on denying coverage whenever possible.
III. DHCF Has Failed To Show The Reasonableness Of Its Policy
In defense of the constitutionality of its policy denying
coverage for self-inflicted injuries, DHCF asserts: "Applying the
exclusions provision in this case is not arbitrary.

It is the

logical result of line-drawing in the coverage of services."
Brief of the Appellee, at 31.
is the demonstrated logic?
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The appellee does not attempt to
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objectives of the UMAP program.

It has not shown what legitimate

state interest is served by allowing coverage in one class of
cases—trauma inflicted by an independent cause—and denying
coverage when the trauma is self-inflicted.
CONCLUSION
Driver does not dispute that UMAP is a limited program and
that not all medical services can be covered.

She does not

challenge the UMAP rule which denies coverage for "psychiatric"
conditions.

Thus, Driver would not seek to have psychotherapy or

psychotropic medications covered, if they were prescribed as a
treatment for her bipolar disorder.

But Driver was not in need

of therapy or medication when she was taken to the emergency
room.

She needed emergency treatment for a life-threatening

condition which reasonably must be covered by UMAP.

To hold

otherwise is contrary to UMAP rules, the state UMAP statute and
the Utah Constitution.
DATED this ^ L y

of July, 2001.

ichael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
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